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LISA A. KLOPPENBERG*
The Public Interest in the Work of
the Courts: Opinions and Beyond**
EVERAL participants in the Innovation and Information
Environment Conference questioned "who owns the law" in
the context of access to court opinions on computer databases.'
Various courts are considering proposals for a public-domain ci-
tation system of computer accessible court opinions, using ven-
dor-neutral forms such as paragraph numbering, in order to
support low cost legal research and to supplement the citation
systems developed by private publishers.2 There is a close con-
nection between calls for a vendor-neutral or public-domain cita-
tion system for the courts and the issue of who "owns" previously
rendered court opinions when parties to the suit want an opinion
vacated pending appeal. Recently, the courts have split on this
question, and their division reflects a larger debate about the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; B.A., 1984,
University of Southern California; J.D., 1987, University of Southern California. I
am grateful to Keith Aoki, Margie Paris, and Mark Zunich for reviewing an early
version of this Comment. Donna Matthews provided excellent editorial and re-
search assistance.
** © 1996 by Lisa A. Kloppenberg.
1 James Love & Vic Garces, Electronic Legal Databases and the Public Domain,
Remarks at the Innovation and Information Environment Conference (Nov. 1995);
see also James Love, Four Years of Struggles to Free the Law, FEFTH CoNF. ON COM-
PUTERS & PRIVACY (Taxpayer Assets Project) 1995 (hereinafter Four Years).
2 For opposing views on the debate about instituting a vendor neutral case law
citation system, compare Donna M. Bergsgaard & Andrew R. Desmond, Keep Gov-
ernment out of the Citation Business, 79 JUDICATURE 61 (1995) with Gary Sherman,
A Simplified System of Citation, 79 JUDICATURE 60 (1995). See also Robert Berring,
On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Legal Information, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 615 (1995); Four Years, supra note 2; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Stat-
utory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1989). For an interesting summary of
litigation between West Publishing Company and the Department of Justice con-
cerning ownership to certain federal court opinions and related political controversy,
see John J. Osland, Debate Rages over Who Owns the Law, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRMUNE Mar. 6, 1995, at 8A.
[249]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
functions of our courts.3 The opposing resolutions of the vacatur
issue exemplify the tension between two competing missions for
the courts, one based on a case processing model and one on a
law articulation model.4 The latter model, with its emphasis on
the public value of adjudication, supports proposals for greater
public access to court opinions.5 Moreover, the public interest in
adjudication encompasses other court activities beyond opinion
production, such as discovery materials and unpublished deter-
minations. We must consider to what extent such adjudication
components should remain private now that technology may
make the inner workings of courts more widely accessible.
I
COMPETING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
Public and private interests compete when litigants seek to va-
cate a lower court ruling while that ruling is being appealed.6
Parties sometimes agree to vacate the lower court opinion as a
condition of settlement, or one party argues that settlement ren-
ders the earlier ruling moot and requests vacatur. These tech-
niques aim to limit the ruling's precedential and preclusive
value.7 In 1992, the California Supreme Court concluded that
California courts may vacate their earlier opinions in order to
3 Of the extensive literature on the vacatur issue, I found two articles particularly
helpful. See Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Deci-
sional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 (1991) (argu-
ing against vacatur due to the public interest in preserving previous court
judgments). I also draw heavily in this Comment on a thoughtful and comprehensive
treatment of vacatur by Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Pref-
erences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994).
4 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 1526-36.
5 See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual
Property & the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 45 (1993-94) (argu-
ing that the focus in intellectual property law on individual ownership prevents us
from recognizing the public interest in "widespread electronic circulation of the very
language of federal judges in federal courthouses as they decide the public's busi-
ness"); see also ANNE WELLS BRANSCOME, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRI-
VACY TO PUBLIC ACCESS 159-73 (1994) (canvassing arguments for broader public
ownership of information gathered by governmental entities, particularly electronic
data); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Black-
mail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 (1992) (arguing that the legal pub-
lic/private distinction privileges the ownership interests of authors at the expense of
the broader public interest in widespread dissemination of information).
6 Fisch, supra note 3, at 591 n.10 (citing cases where courts balance public and
private interests to determine whether to approve vacatur).
7 Resnik, supra note 3, at 1473. For references to the extensive literature on pre-
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induce settlement.8 However, the United States Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion in 1994, finding that federal
courts should not allow vacatur as a condition of settlement ab-
sent exceptional circumstances.9 The Court reasoned in part that
the judgment already rendered has a public value which the pri-
vate parties should not be entitled to automatically erase: "Judi-
cial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the
legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of
private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that
the public interest would be served by a vacatur."' 1 The division
between the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court reflects a larger debate about prioritizing the
functions of courts. Do courts sit primarily to resolve private dis-
putes efficiently? How much emphasis should be placed on
courts' public "lawsaying" function" when this public conflicts
with the interests of private litigants? I briefly explore the two
cases to illuminate the public and private interests at stake and
the tensions between the competing court models.
II
OPPOSING RESOLUTIONS OF THE VACATUR ISSUE
Mr. Neary was a cattle rancher who believed that governmen-
tal pesticide spraying had poisoned his cattle.' 2 The University
of California reported that Neary's "deficient ranch management
practices [had] caused illness and death of many of Neary's cat-
tle."' 3 Neary sued for libel and a jury awarded him $7 million. 4
During the appeal, the parties worked out a settlement in which
cedent, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking As-
pects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1994).
8 Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
9 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
10 Id. at 392 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Phillips
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 428 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
n See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1488 (the federal courts' interest in "expounding"
federal law is based on desires to promote uniformity in federal law and vindicate
federal rights); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 299 (1990)
(describing the Supreme Court's recognition of its role in "public norm creation");
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1988) (discussing the courts' role in creating and advancing
public values through legal rulings).




Neary would receive $3 million and the trial court would vacate
its earlier opinion.'5 Except for certain kinds of cases like class
actions, settlement of a civil lawsuit is a totally private, party-
controlled matter. 16 The parties in Neary could have settled
without disturbing the trial court's opinion, as most parties do.
However, defendants wanted to erase the precedent, and Neary
presumably preferred a secure $3 million to the uncertainty and
delay of the appellate process.17 Both parties sought an end to
the expensive, thirteen-year dispute."8
The California Supreme Court identified three reasons for let-
ting the trial court vacate its judgment. First, the majority rea-
soned that the parties had financed this odyssey and that courts
exist for litigants, not the other way around. 9 Thus, private liti-
gants must retain the autonomy to settle, including demanding
vacatur as a condition. Second, although substantial court and
public resources had already been invested in this private contro-
versy, the court did not view litigation as a search for truth.20
Instead, the court viewed it as primarily a dispute resolution pro-
cess, so judicial integrity would not be undermined by disposing
of the dispute via vacatur.21 Finally, the justices were concerned
with efficiency-they believed they would promote more settle-
ments in the future by allowing vacatur.22 They would also con-
serve party and appellate judicial resources in the immediate
controversy.23
The dissenting justice disagreed that vacatur would achieve ef-
ficiency because incentives to settle before trial would diminish
under the majority's presumption.24 If the precedential effect of
a ruling could be nullifed later, parties with sufficient resources
would have less incentive to settle before the ruling. Further, he
emphasized the public interest in the opinions of a taxpayer-fi-
15 Id.16 Fisch, supra note 3, at 598; FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e).
17 Apparently, the veterinarian defendants were concerned about the judgment's
affect on their professional reputations. Neary, 834 P.2d at 131 (Kennard, J..
dissenting).
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. The court noted: "Homilies about 'judicial integrity' and 'legal truth' will
ring hollow in the ears of the parties." Id
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 121.
23Id.
24 Id. at 128-30 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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nanced institution: "the ultimate purpose of a judgment is to ad-
minister the laws . .. and thereby do substantial justice."25
During the pretrial, trial and first appellate stage of Neary, signif-
icant public resources had been devoted to the case, rendering it
no longer a wholly private matter. Moreover, he reasoned that
this case involved a matter of significant public concern involving
allegations of unsafe governmental pesticide spraying and the
conduct of state employees.26 He was also concerned about the
integrity of a system which lessened the importance of unfavora-
ble decisions when parties could purchase vacatur.2 7
One justice concurred on "the facts of this case"-apparently
because the precedential value of the lower court's ruling in
Neary was factually limited.28 But he expressed concern about
the implications of the broad majority presumption, particularly
the specter of vacatur in products liability cases where the prece-
dential value of an opinion would be greater.29 There, a pre-
sumption against vacatur would be more efficient for the courts
because other victims could use preclusion principles against a
defendant in earlier judgments.3 °
The United States Supreme Court opinion in Bonner Mall two
years later is a useful contrast to Neary. A bankruptcy court is-
sued an important legal ruling, construing the recently revised
Bankruptcy Code as not containing the "new value" exception.31
The district and appellate courts disagreed.32 After the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case, the parties entered a consensual
plan of reorganization, which effectively mooted the litigation.33
Thereafter, one party asked the Court to vacate the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion, which was adverse to its interests. 34
The Court refused to do so, holding that mootness by reason of
settlement does not generally justify vacatur of a prior judgment.
25 Id. at 127.26 Id. at 130-31.
27 Id. at 127-28.
28 Id. at 126 (Mosk, J., concurring).29 Id. at 126-27.
30 Id. at 127; see also Fisch, supra note 3, at 593-94. Professor Resnik demon-
strates, however, that courts vary in how willing they are to deny future preclusive
effects or deny affording authoritative or persuasive weight to even vacated prior
legal opinions. Resnik, supra note 3, at 1501-11.





Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, relied on the public
interest in the court opinion already rendered.35 The rulings con-
cerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy Code were important
precedent, which litigants and the public rely on to shape their
conduct.36 The Court also reasoned that allowing vacatur might
deter pretrial settlements by encouraging litigants to "roll the
dice" at the trial level and seek vacatur later if necessary.3 7 Fi-
nally, the Court emphasized that the settlement was voluntary
and the party seeking vacatur could instead pursue appellate re-
versal of the earlier ruling.38
III
THE STRENGTH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
WORK OF COURTS
Although the Bonner Court disagreed with the Neary court
about whether vacatur on appeal promotes efficient resolution of
disputes for parties and courts, both courts were genuinely con-
cerned with efficient case processing. The Supreme Court saw
little conflict in the vacatur context between the case processing
and lawsaying functions of the federal courts. But by emphasiz-
ing the general public interest in court opinions, the Supreme
Court differed significantly from the California court about the
extent of the public interest in court opinions. In so doing, the
Court gave support to a law articulation model of adjudication. 39
I suggest that courts need to perform both roles-and which
function is emphasized in a particular case should depend on the
substantive issue and the level of court involved.' For example,
35 Id. at 392.36 Id. at 393; see also Burnet v. Coronnado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[I]n most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.").
37 Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393.38 Id. at 392.
39 The vacatur cases and related scholarship provide some interesting philosophi-
cal alignments. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia authored Bonner Mall. An-
other "conservative," Judge Frank Easterbrook, also emphasized the public value in
judicial opinions when writing for the Seventh Circuit on the vacatur issue. In re
Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988). Their emphasis on the "lawsay-
ing" function of the courts in these opinions is to some extent harmonious with the
emphasis of some "liberal" scholars. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 11; Fiss, supra
note 11.
40 This suggestion parallels my treatment of other doctrines courts have developed
for mediating between these two functions. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured
Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297 (1996) (hereinafter Measured); Lisa A. Klop-
[Vol. 75, 1996]
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the Supreme Court has a heightened lawsaying function in con-
stitutional cases, and it should hesitate before reflexively apply-
ing the doctrine of avoiding "unnecessary" constitutional
determinations." Similarly, vacatur is less appropriate where an
opinion has significant precedential import or preclusive poten-
tial. Thus, courts should be more hesitant to vacate appellate
opinions as opposed to trial court rulings because of our hierar-
chical system of precedent. Additionally, vacatur is less appro-
priate when a powerful repeat player is requesting vacatur to
shape the law in a particular area. 2
CONCLUSION
The Court's emphasis on the public interest in Bonner lends
greater credence to the argument for greater public access to
court opinions (which might be accomplished through a vendor
neutral citation system). In addition, this public interest extends
beyond opinions to reach other court activities, such as discov-
ery;43 unpublished and de-published determinations and deci-
sions to selectively publish;44 the work of magistrates; 45
settlements; status conferences; and judicial efforts to encourage
penberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003 (1994) (hereinaf-
ter Avoiding).
41 See Measured, supra note 40; Avoiding, supra note 40.
42 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 1525. Professor Resnik explores the complexity of
the public interest in published court opinions in a much more comprehensive man-
ner than this Comment. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 1536-39 (her two conflicting
evaluations of the vacatur practice reflects the impossibility of a single, simplistic
right answer about the mission of the courts).
43 For example, it may be less costly for courts and parties to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d), which presumptively requires the filing of discovery
materials with a court absent an order to the contrary, if discovery is exchanged or
stored in computer-readable form. However, the Supreme Court, in construing
Washington State discovery rules, broadly stated that "pretrial depositions and inter-
rogatories are not public components of a civil trial." Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); see also RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LrTIGATION 577-79 (2d ed. 1992) (collecting some arguments
for greater public access to pretrial materials); Resnik, supra note 4, at 1493-94 n.85.
44 For arguments that such practices endanger courts' function of espousing public
values, see Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They
Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Deci-
sions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757 (1995) and Howard Slavitt,
Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication,
and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 109 (1995) (challenging California and fed-
eral court practices).
45 "By the early 1990's ... the number of magistrates nearly equaled the number
of Article III district judges." MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 43, at 712. The
enormous significance of pretrial activity in civil litigation today is demonstrated by
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alternative dispute resolution. 6
Each item on this preliminary list must be examined in light of
competing public and private interests. For example, even if pri-
vate parties do not "own" previously published court opinions,
they may be entitled to control aspects of litigation traditionally
considered private. Increased public access may plague already
overburdened judges and administrators or impose substantial
costs or delay. Public exposure of certain information may lead
some litigants to opt out of the court system. Although these
adjudication-related activities are often deemed private by law-
yers, litigants and judges, we should at least be debating what
parts of this public system should remain private as technology
enables cheaper and easier public access. 7 Courts are publicly
financed and they perform several important governmental mis-
sions. We need and deserve access to information about the
workings of the judicial branch so that we can monitor courts and
better reflect on their priorities as a polity.
48
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631.
46 Resnik, supra note 3, at 1500-01. Professor Resnik has demonstrated how fed-
eral judges have focused increasingly in recent decades on strengthened judicial
management techniques, including increased judicial settlement and alternative dis-
pute resolution efforts. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1991); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 374 (1982).
47 For example, the Legal Information Institute of Cornell Law School has put
information online from 15 years of civil litigation in federal court. This project
should enable easier empirical research and monitoring of the courts' work. Profes-
sors Stephen Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont of Cornell Law School constructed the
database with information that was generated by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and assembled by the Federal Judicial Center. The data are
available online at URL: http://www.law.cornell.edu/ or URL: http://teddy.law.cor-
nell.edu:8090/questata.htm.
48 The American Judicature Society supports cameras in the courtroom in order
to enable citizens to evaluate the courts as a democratic institution and to increase
public support for and understanding of the judicial process. Frances Kahn Zemans,
Public Access: The Ultimate Guardian of Fairness in our Justice System, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 173 (1996).
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